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Time and Temporality: M. Heidegger's Interpretation versus H. Bergson's Intuition

The issue of the postmodern conceptualization of temporality is realized in a number of different fields of science and scientific schools. At the same time the relationship between discourse of temporality as theory and discursive practices of temporal modes is widely represented both in "high" and popular culture. As a result, classical concepts and traditional notions have been abandoned with the consequent predominance of plurality of meanings and variability of senses, which opens theoretical space for examining time and temporality both in modernity and postmodernity.

The aim of theorizing temporality in this article is presented as conceptual reconstruction of temporality in Heidegger's and Bergson's ideas who, while working approximately at the same period, addressed temporality from different standpoints; however, both laid the foundation for the postmodern conceptual apparatus of researching temporality. The attempts of analyzing temporality also include their most influential approaches to the interaction of "interpretation" and "intuition" in the post-paradigmatic "drift" under the "postmodern conditions". The methods of the analysis are stipulated by the interdisciplinary character of the research, which demands complex approaches and systematic investigation with the bias on phenomenological, hermeneutic and post-structural methods.

The scientific novelty of the research lies in the reconstruction of the notion and models of temporality in Heidegger's and Bergson's conceptions with the accent on the "volumetrical" reflections of both scientists, which include the dialogue relations in their creating meanings and concept, the dialogism (M. Bakhtin) in painting the polyphonic picture of the world. At present, temporality is often used both as a flexible notion and a kind of epiphenomenon of time, occupying mid-positions between the absolute time and the relative time. Heidegger accentuates the notional character of time, however using the term "phenomenon" in some cases, as for "Bergsonism" duration is presented as a notion in its conceptual development (Deleuze). According to Heidegger, all philosophic propositions are temporal ones; still he obviously could not have introduced his "finite temporalization" without Bergson's claim of the ontological priority of duration. Though in the postmodern theory it is accepted that the unprecedented stress on temporality is due to Heidegger, the recognition should go back to Bergson for having transformed the classical modes of time and temporality and traditional approaches to their conceptualization.

Keywords: *ontology, conceptualization, duration, dimensions, dialogism, interdisciplinary characteristics.*

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Час і темпоральність: інтерпретація М. Гайдеггера versus інтуїція А. Бергсона

Постмодерністська концептуалізація темпоральності у теперішній час розглядається у чисельних предметних сферах науки представниками різних дослідницьких напрямів. Водночас відбувається становлення проблемної сфери аналізу дискурсу темпоральності в науці і дискурсивних практик темпоральності у модусах як "високої", так і масової культури, внаслідок чого знімаються класичні концепти і традиційні поняття з наступним домінуванням плюральності знань і амбівалентності смислів, що відкриває теоретичний простір для аналізу часу і темпоральності і в модерні, і в постмодерні.

Мета теоретичного дослідження темпоральності в цій статті розуміється як концептуальна реконструкція темпоральності в ідеях Гайдеггера і Бергсона, які працювали приблизно одночасно, і звертаючись до темпоральності з різних теоретичних позицій, заклали основи для постмодерністського концептуального апарату щодо аналізу темпоральності. Аналітичні й емпіричні підходи до темпоральності представляють найбільш впливові трактування взаємодії "інтерпретації" та "інтуїції" в постпарадигматичному "дрейфі" умов постмодерну у працях Гайдеггера і Бергсона. Методологія аналізу зумовлена міждисциплінарним характером



дослідження із подібним підходом феноменологічних, герменевтичних та постструктуралістських методів.

Наукова новизна роботи полягає в реконструкції понять і моделей темпоральності у Гайдеггера і Бергсона з акцентом на "об'ємних" репрезентаціях темпоральності в роботах цих двох теоретиків, останнє залучає діалогічні відносини (М. Бахтін) у створенні поліфонічної картини світу. У теперішній час поняття темпоральності часто використовується як своєрідний епіфеномен часу, що займає гнучке положення поміж абсолютним і відносним часом. Якщо Гайдеггер акцентує понятійний характер часу, в той же час використовуючи термін «феномен» в деяких випадках, то в "бергсонізмі" "duration" постає як поняття у своєму концептуальному розвитку (Дельоз). За Гайдеггером, усі філософські твердження є темпоральними, але в той же час є зрозумілим, що він не зміг би ввести свою "граничну темпоралізацію" без затвердження Бергсоном онтологічної переваги для "duration". І хоча в постмодернізмі вважається, що безпрецедентна акцентуалізація темпоральності – це заслуга Гайдеггера, необхідно визнати той факт, що саме Бергсон трансформував класичні модули часу і традиційні підходи до їх концептуалізації.

Keywords: онтологія, концептуалізація, duration, виміри, діалогизм, міждисциплінарність

The problem statement.

The scientific study of the development of the philosophic concepts in the late XXth century calls into question the problems that are perhaps the most fundamental statements of the traditional theory, namely, its anthropological basis, which constitutes the "frames" of the problematic fields of the postmodern human being. This issue of the postmodern "agenda" is realized in a large number of scientific schools and trends, and the hallmark of the efforts is the frequency with which it is addressed. The relationship between discourse as science and discursive practices, used by individuals in the experiences of their living in the social world, can be vividly represented both in "high" and "pop" culture: fiction, theatre, cinematography, mass-media, in the diverse and versatile experiences of postmodernity, which occasion the "self". As a result, researchers risk interpretations with the burden of traditional conceptions and contextual implications. And here of great importance are the names of two philosophers who have abandoned formal conceptualization: M. Heidegger and H. Bergson. M. Foucault wrote in one of his classical works of theory that there are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is going on looking and reflecting at all (Foucault, 1990).

M. Heidegger's research is by all means a "grand occasion" of special beauty and meditative wisdom concerning "all things" in their temporal-spatial unfolding (Capobianco, 2015, p. 3). It is significant that in his articulation of the human existence as the "shining manifestation" of the truth ("Aletheia") M. Heidegger steps aside from the reduction of

the being to the "sense", which was a popular tendency when he wrote his most famous books, instead he asserts the idea of creating the "meaning". Putting the phenomenon of Time and "Zeitlichkeit" into the problematization of the ontology, Heidegger accentuates the issues that are conceptually important in the context of this paper: the interdisciplinary complications of Time (Zeit) and the general ambiguity of being (Dasein).

The problem also concerns great predicaments in interpreting time, first of all, what, in fact, time is (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 301). Generally speaking, the difficulty of comprehension and interpretation of "Time" seems to be a key word in Heidegger's writings. The problematization of temporality is also of great significance as an ontological issue, which is accounted for by its "undecided" character, according to Heidegger's words.

It is important that in the same way Heidegger stresses the "notional character" of time in his appeal to keep to its conceptual characteristics. However, he often determines time as a "phenomenon" and here arises some ambivalence: is time a category or a phenomenon?

It is well known that according to I. Kant "the category" is primary, and in Kant's works time is presented as a universal form of systematization of the sensual experience (Medova, 2006).

Heidegger stresses that it is worth scientists' efforts to make good use of the critical analysis of the notion of time to understand the phenomenon of time. Still the question remains: what does Heidegger mean: some universal concept or a kind of phenomenon? It is interesting to note that in the contemporary philosophic encyclopedic dictionary

V. E. Kemerov defines time precisely as a category, which presents the initial scales for the notion of being (2004 p. 129).

As for H. Bergson and his methodology of intuition, we can't but remind of a very famous (though not scientifically valid) remark made by B. Russel who said ironically that intuition works best of all with bats, bees, and Bergson. However, Bergson's devoted proponent G. Deleuze was sure that Bergson belonged to the "space" of philosophy. Generally speaking, G. Deleuze made a lot to save Bergson from ideological labels, such as "psychologisms", "literature intentions", etc. In connection with the well-known claim of Deleuze that a true philosopher is always engaged in the invention of concepts, it should be mentioned that Deleuze first said that concerning H. Bergson (Dyakov, 2013. p. 93).

G. Deleuze maintained that duration, memory and "elan vital" were significant notions in Bergson's investigations, he added that Bergson's intuition was also a concept, though it was understood by Deleuze as a method (Deleuze, 2001).

However, Deleuze asserts that Bergson's duration is not simply "vital experience", it is "extended" experience, because experience is always a composite of space and duration (Deleuze, 2001, p. 250). In this context of great importance are E. Husserl's words that intuition possesses many differentiations, which are streaming in parallels with logical categories (Gusserl, 2000, p. 74). And here again we face the same problem of definitions: is intuition a notion, a method, or both?

H. Bergson, being a great opponent of the Cartesian dualism, claims that intuition is higher than intellect, by which he challenges the mechanistic philosophy of nature. As far as temporality is concerned, it is paid great attention both by Heidegger and Bergson. Despite their different methodological approaches and conceptual statements, both philosophers – chronologically about at the same time – created the "turn" in problematizing temporality, both invented concepts and notions that lay at the foundation of their doctrines with the central theme of "Man" in "Time" and at the given "Moment".

The analysis of the recent research.

Though postmodern philosophers often dispute about what the "constant universal"

can be and what it is not, which discourses are "inherent" to Man and which serve as a "constant thread" in the totality of human experience, they, as a rule, agree that the project of "Time" and "Temporality" reconciles them all, though mentioning that not every philosopher deals with "time" (Hoy, 2012).

Very few scientists have not put "Time" and "Temporality" in the focus of their research, especially if it means investigations in hermeneutics and phenomenology (Hinton, & Willemsen, eds. 2017).

While recognizing the substantially "determined" character of philosophic developments in the research of time and temporality, it is necessary to address the degree to which it has influenced recently many disciplines and subjects of knowledge. Currently, researchers explore temporality in the totality of postmodern science, which is due to the fact that contemporary situation represents a more revolutionary civilization "drift" that any of the countries, both in the West and in the East, have ever known. J. Caputo writes that in antiquity the search for the universal concepts, philosophic "absolutes" meant a form of life, the very model of "living well", i.e. knowledge linked with "action and passion" (Caputo, 2015, p. 25). In the Middle Ages, the West went to church, and this led to the union of philosophy and theology in their search for truth, goodness and beauty as the search for God [8, p. 27]. Modernity is well known to change everything, for modernity put forth "the beam of reason and with that the very terms that had been used "to make sense" of the world changed, and "words that precisely meant one thing took on new meaning"(Caputo, 2015, p. 27). A category (an "old word" that goes back to Aristotle) in this sense is "one of the modernity's most important inventions"(Caputo, 2015, p. 32-33).

In postmodernity, Truth is not the culture, but a mode of thought, and the best way to think of postmodernism is something like "a style" rather than a "body of doctrines" (Caputo, 2015, p. 5).

"The truth is not an absolute, it is just an "Event", maintains S. Zizek (Zizek, 2014). If there were a "candidate" for Truth nowadays, it would be "Science". The term can be capitalized as it means "everything": e.g. "The theory of Everything" as the new cosmology and its aim, S. Hawking is known to "encapsulate" a theory



of the entire universe in the famous last lines of his "Brief History of Time" (Hawking, 1998).

However the famous "Theory of Everything" is but "one more theory", it is of "everything", but in itself is not "everything".

Postmodern science can be represented, according to scientists, being in a condition of anarchy. The famous philosopher of science P. Feyerabend writes: "The only principle that does not inhibit progress is: anything goes... For what appears as "sloppiness", "chaos" or "opportunities"... has a most important function in the development of these very theories which we today regard as essential parts of our knowledge" (Appignanesi & Garratt, 2007, p. 109).

At present "temporality" both as a concept and a term is so widely used that it is often applied as a kind of "umbrella" notion, a flexible notion of time, which occupies a middle position between the "absolute" time and the "relative" time, sometimes trying to move past both positions. As it usually happens in postmodernism, much theoretical reflection is presented in literary criticism. It is interesting that in some approaches to this very problematic field time is analyzed along with space – i.e. "chronotope", though Western scientists do not, as a rule, use this term (Francesse, 1997). H. Bergson's notion of time is particularly widely used in the studies of literature, for example, S. Haqshenas' analysis of Bergsonian conceptions of time in the "Blind Owl" by S. Hedayat and "The Sound and the Fury" by W. Faulkner, in which the stream of consciousness deliberately defies the traditional temporal division (Haqshenas, 2016). The general critical attitude has not been changed since the end of the last century, though at present the approaches show some definite signs of evolution towards a greater degree of reflection of different forms of art, pop-culture art, in particular.

Nowadays temporality is under research in cinematography, in music, sculpture, etc. The evolution of theorizing temporality is presented in the historical comparative analyses, in the chronological studies of the concepts concerned (Baetens et al, 2016).

It is interesting to mention that in some approaches to literary criticism time is analyzed along with space, which reminds, to some extent, of M. Bakhtin's concepts of "dialogisms" and "chronotope" (Francesse, 1997). Touching

upon pop-literature, it is worth providing an example of the "alternative history", the genre, which deals with the variability of time. Of course, the generic theory of history, whether explicitly or implicitly, is at the basis of all alternative narratives, films and series, which are very popular nowadays (Helekson, 2001).

Of special interest is the use of "temporality" in linguistics, both in grammar ("time" and "tense") and in semantics: what is the semantics of the expressions with a temporal reference? Linguists suggest that temporality should be taken to mean degrees of certainty understood as degrees of acceptability concerning the eventuality referred to in the speaker's utterance. Presenting examples from Judo-European and non-Judo-European languages, the scientists show that speakers represent past, present and future as degrees of epistemic modality.

Thus, K. M. Jaszczolt sets the results of her research in the context of both linguistic and philosophic investigation (Jaszczolt, 2009).

Summing it up, it is necessary to come back to philosophy and stress its focus on the notions, which are used in "Theory".

Of course, philosophers stress that it is due to M. Heidegger, to his rethinking of temporality and history that postmodern theory poses an unprecedented challenge to Western thought by calling into question our traditional notions of Being and Time (Allen, 1989). In his analysis of postmodernity F. Jameson puts a "key question": after the end of history, what? No further beginning being foreseen it can only be the end of something else. But modernism already ended some time ago and with it presumably, time itself, as it was told that space was supposed to replace time in the general ontological scheme of things (Jameson, 2003). As postmodern theory and discursive practices are closely connected with ideology, power and politics, the researchers problematize the political value of "Time". Hence there are questions: Where does this value reside? Should politics place its hope in the future possibility or does that simply defer action in the present? Can the present ground a vision of change or is it circumscribed by the status quo? (Huehlo, 2009.)

In the existential tradition some contemporary researchers oppose the temporality of being to the factor of representing time; in the phenomenological sociology the notion of

temporality is used for describing the dynamic social subjects in the analysis of the mutually transformed social phenomena (Boldachyev et al.)

Speaking about time and scientific ideas of temporality in Heidegger's books, general scientists claim that all works of Heidegger, both early and late ones, are written under deep influence of the hermeneutic philosophy, no doubt, with the diversity of perspectives in the development of the hermeneutic interpretation (Bowler, 2016). The contemporary researchers analyze Heidegger's ideas with a new kind of interest, focusing on his submerging into the inevitable "distortion" of the present in each specific case of interpretation. However, at present scientists deal with high code of "telos" or "Grund" (Vattimo, 2019). As far as H. Bergson's contribution to postmodern theory, it is by all means considered of great importance thanks mainly to his admirer and follower J. Deleuze. Here it should be mentioned that despite the general negative attitude of postmodern philosophers towards phenomenology, they had tried to find some alternative phenomenological versions, and, in fact, they found them in Heidegger's teachings. However, German phenomenology did not appeal to J. Deleuze and he decided to take foothold in the French version of phenomenology, Bergson's philosophy, namely (Deleuze, p. 301). J. Deleuze claims that Bergsonian duration turns out to be a kind of multitude, which is opposite to the metric multitude. Thus, Bergson makes two types of multitude: on the one hand, – continuous and qualitative, on the other, – numerical and discrete, and there is Bergsonian "matter" between them (Dombrovan, 2018.). In Heidegger's theory it is temporality that makes understanding Dasein, temporality is the main condition of possibility for any understanding (Dyakov, 2013, p. 408). Heidegger stresses: temporality as a "source" is more abundant than everything that is running out of it: in the domain of the ontological possibility it is higher than "the real". Any genesis in the ontological field is not growth and development, but degeneration because "the present" takes itself off from the source (Dyakov, 2013., p. 410). Heidegger puts forward temporality of Dasein per se because of the horizontal temporality scheme, in this the great scientist addresses "comprehension", which beginning with antiquity means thinking:

Heidegger accentuates the thought that all the ontological positions are, in fact, temporal statements. They are all investigations of the structure and possibilities of life in the light of temporality. Thus, according to Heidegger, all ontological statements possess the character of *veritas temporalis*, which means that ontology is temporal science (Dyakov, 2013, p. 431).

It is important that H. Bergson extends duration beyond the philosophical realm. Of course, the latter is stipulated firstly by the fact that H. Bergson was himself "a man of letters", and secondly, by the specific nature of his philosophy, by the "other vision", not based on the scientific rationalism or materialistic logic. The central notion in Bergson's themes, which have been enumerated before, is the "pure", duration, that is different from time and that is the initial basis of all being. According to Bergson, philosophy is a kind of "vital world", and outside the limits of the "self-world" all the philosophical issues become scholastic and poorly formed. Living life and coping with it, we mix both the internal and the external in the indivisible unity of the succession of events. The reality of time is the first principle of the Bergsonian metaphysics. It is important that its moments are mutually penetrating, overcoming, prolongating "the past in its individualism to the present". The "deeper" and "richer" is our living life, the more we realize its reality as the unique indivisible stream. These moments construct the organic unity as well as the musical notes from the melody (scientists notion that Bergson's father was a composer, so the metaphor "the melody of life" is very impressive), in order to catch up all the "melody of life" it is not enough to play two or three notes, to press two or three keys.

As for the problem of method in Bergson's writings, E. Je Roy in his famous book, dedicated to Bergson, asserts that Bergson's "new philosophy" includes two parts: "Method" and "Teaching" (Je Roy, 2005). On the whole, it is necessary to accentuate the intention of researches to use both Heidegger's and Bergson's "temporality" in the diverse kinds of critical analysis of the "state of matters" and "positions" of temporality in late capitalism, post-industrial society, postmodern culture and quite a number of other "posts" (Massey, 2016.).

In conclusion, we ought to touch upon the problem of translation. As it has been



mentioned by many translators of Heidegger's texts, not only the general style and stylistics, Heidegger's own key words present especial problem to translators. Moreover, it is Heidegger who insists that every translation is an act of interpretation. The texts translated into English differ greatly from Russian translations (presumably, from translations into other languages as well). In the academic world the translations of Heidegger's books into English by M. King (generally speaking her research of the problem on the whole) are considered one of the most successful attempts (King, 2010.). Still, as A. Y. Chernyakov puts it in his "afterword" to the translation of "Basic Problems of Phenomenology", it is early to put the well-known translations into the academic canon (Chernyakov, 2001).

The purpose of the publication.

The scientific target of this paper can be presented as conceptual reconstruction of the notion of temporality in the problematic field of M. Heidegger's and H. Bergson's ideas. The consequent approaches do not imply the "quest" for formulas and ultimate conclusions: temporality is not an abstract model either in Heidegger's or in Bergson's teachings. Our perspective requires the development (however not complete) of the conceptual apparatus, which is important as it can be applied to specific lives of the definite individuals – men and women – and can help to analyze individual experience in the ways of temporality.

The statement of the basic material.

In his analysis of the traditional notion of time M. Heidegger puts definite and specific accent on the fact that antiquity established the essentialistic grounds of the meanings of time. Aristotle's thoughts concerning time laid the foundation for St. Augustine's explanations and interpretations of time in his "Confessions", interpretations by Plotin, Thomas Aquinas, F. Suarez (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 302). While showing the further development in the investigation of time, M. Heidegger names some outstanding philosophers who represent modernity: Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and speaking of the "recent time", he put an accent on H. Bergson. Commenting upon this last name in his list, Heidegger stresses that Bergson came into polemics with Aristotle in his attempts to step beyond the limits of the traditional notion of time ("temps") and substitute it with

"duration" ("durée"). H. Bergson also opens discussions with Einstein concerning his theory of relativity, however, Heidegger continues, he did not manage to grasp the true core of the phenomenon of time. Still Bergson's efforts are valuable as they are evidence of his philosophic search and attempts to trespass the limits of the classical notion of time (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 304).

In Heidegger's brief review of Aristotle's conception of time the special accent seems to be made on the first questions, put by Aristotle: what is time and where is it? Heidegger asks, how time can be "in presence" and in "Dasein", provided those parts, which form time, are not real: time includes the past and the future, but the first one has gone away, and the second one has not come yet. It is the present, the "in- and within time" essence that is always being at the moment (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 305). Heidegger comments that we speak about "time passing", about the "stream of time", though time in itself does not represent any kind of movement. According to Aristotle, time is motion, so it can be countable. Heidegger adds that "motion" must not be "spatial", and he determines this characteristic of time by the term "dimension". For Heidegger, it is significant, because he claims that Bergson interprets Aristotle's notion of time not in a proper and correct way, when he explains this characteristic of time as being spatial [Khaydegger, 2001, p. 307]. Heidegger stresses not once that Bergsonian teaching about time and duration has roots in his polemics with Aristotle, and in this polemics Bergson comes to the false interpretation of Aristotle's definition of time. While citing Aristotle, Heidegger writes that time in its essence cannot be a "borderline", it is transition and dimension, it is open into "not yet" and "already none" (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 326). Heidegger implicitly continues his debates with Bergson when he stresses that "the now", taken in the continuum of time, is not a "borderline" but that, which he determines as "duration". It is significant that Heidegger, stepping aside from direct or indirect debates with Bergson, puts an accent on one of the most valid characteristics of time, which was not elaborated by Bergson; it was Kant who investigated it: before the actual reality, before the moving one and the one being immobile, time itself somehow had already existed (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 330].

Actually, Heidegger constantly accentuates the thought that the world is a structural moment of "Sein", consequently, the possibilities of "Dasein" are rooted in time. He stresses that any reflection of time, its recognizing and grasping are possible thanks to such specific feature of time as temporality (Khaydegger, 2001, p. 364). Comprehension of being and reflection of its comprehension in philosophy ought to be revealed in its temporal possibility, claims Heidegger. It must be noted that in this context Heidegger refers to Dilthey who separates comprehension and explanation. In the context of this article it should be mentioned that we specifically comprehend theory as understanding (from the Greek "to reflect"). In the connection of "to reflect" and "to look at", they contextualize each other, so it is not desirable to separate them by specifying or limiting them in their interrelation.

On the contrary, it is important to preserve the potential of each other in synergetics viewed as a multidisciplinary research approach (Dombrovan, 2018.). In general, according to Heidegger, it is temporality that makes it possible to understand "Dasein".

Temporality is the main condition of any possibility for any understanding [Dombrovan, 2018., p. 408]. Heidegger stresses: temporality as a "source" is more "ample", – everything is running out of it, it is overflowing. Heidegger puts forward temporality of "Dasein" per se because of its horizon – comprehension, which, beginning with antiquity, means "to think". He accentuates the idea that all the ontological positions are, in fact, temporal statements, its "truths" represent investigations of the structure and possibilities of life in the light of temporality.

As it is stated before, scientific interest to H. Bergson is being increasing in postmodernism due to the postmodern theory in general. E. Levinas precisely accentuates Bergson's principal contribution to philosophy: "The theory of duration. The destruction of the primacy of clock time, the idea that the time of physics is merely derived. Without this affirmation of somehow "ontological" and not merely psychological priority of the duration irreducible to linear and homogeneous time, Heidegger would not have been able to venture his conception of Dasein's finite temporalization, despite the radical difference, which separates,

of course, the Bergsonian conception of time from Heidegger's conception. The credit goes back to Bergson for having liberated philosophy from the prestigious model of scientific time" (Massey, 2016., p. 2).

For Bergson, time is the integral of real things, just as much as their material characteristics or sizes.

When a flower grows, it takes a period of real time to it to flourish, which cannot be quickened or slowed down, nor can it be eliminated from the process of growth. Bergson names this real time as "duration", and the internal processes flow into one another with no clear boundaries that can separate one phase of duration from another. According to Bergson's philosophy, the past does not disappear but smoothly flows into the present forming an indivisible dynamic unity (Bergson, 1965). Bergson's "project", as researchers claim, has developed according to what is understood as different dimensions of time. M. Sinclair clarifies: "Time and Free Will" concerns, in principle, the present, "Matter and Memory" addresses the past, "Creative Evolution" focuses on the future. The development of the idea of duration can be understood in another sense, the commentator proceeds, that Bergson extends duration beyond the philosophical realms, as it is defined in "Time and Free Will" in opposition to the spatial world of things (Sinclair, 2020, p. 3). It is worth mentioning again (in a parenthetical way) that Bergson's notion of time is widely used in the studies of literature. Of course, the latter is stipulated by the specific nature of his philosophy, by the "other vision", not based on the scientific rationalism and materialistic logic. The central notion in Bergson's themes, which have been enumerated before, is the "pure" duration, that is different from time and that lies in the initial basis of being. According to Bergson, philosophy is a kind of "vital world", and outside limits of the "vital world" all the philosophical issues become scholastic and poorly formed. The reality of time is the first principle of the Bergsonian metaphysics. For life's nature it is important that its moments are mutually penetrating, and these moments construct the organic unity.

In fact all the span of the human life can reveal the secret of human personality. It is significant that in the notions of the philosophy of life, "the life" is interpreted by Bergson as



an absolute infinity, the world's beginning, which unlike matter and cogito possesses an active movable beginning. Bergson agrees with determinists that in viewing a separate action, we see that it is completely determined by what has preceded it. But the problem is – Bergson specifies, – that this interpretation is true if the action is taken in its isolation, however, the latter is the false intellectual abstraction. Bergson mentions that an individual's life and his/her personality are obviously not the same. On the whole, the nature of life is creative, and an individual, as the whole, is by all means creative simply because he/she is living. "Free will" is a creative action, so it is clear that Bergson does not believe in determinism, because our ability to believe is the quality of intuition, and the function of intuition is to perceive our lives as the whole matter (Bergson, 1965). Of great significance is the fact, that Bergson marks out cognition and intuition as two main life forms, which are initially united in "elan vital". (Here again we have to touch upon the theme of "Deleuze-Bergson").

When we claim that the research of these relations rotates around the problems of pluralism, notion, formation and difference, we mean not any declaration of four different problems but one and the same, though being analyzed from four different positions (Dyakov, 2013, p. 311). And here we should recollect that for Deleuze "philosophy is a discipline, which is made of creating concepts" (Chernyakov, 2001, p. 9). The philosopher is a "friend" of concepts, he is always in dependence on the concepts (Chernyakov, 2001, p. 9). If man manages to reach the level of the "creative personality", it is due to acting, creating, not to "looking" or "observing".

However, the creative emotion, which actualizes all the levels, is peculiar, and only the "chosen souls" possess it. Presumably, it shows a kind of genesis of intuition in intellect (Lundy & Deleuze, 2018).

Deleuze maintains that both Bergson and representatives of phenomenology (Heidegger, Merlo-Ponti et al) tried to find the way out of the impasse for psychology, despite the fact that their searches were in different directions: phenomenology claims that any consciousness is consciousness of something, Bergson asserts that any consciousness is "something". In phenomenology the classical dualism of matter

and consciousness is preserved, in Bergsonism there is none of them, only images and motion. Though some philosophers had said that matter was in itself perception (Y. Berkeley), it is Bergson who announced that matter interflows into its perception (13, p. 302-303). Still this most important philosophic "turn" can be represented as the new dismemberment of the images of matter, which were considered conceptually intact. Hence, the appeal to H. Bergson and his ideas of formation, duration and new understanding of time.

Conclusion and major future challenges.

"Temporality" is taking a range of postmodern definitions at multiple levels from theory to practice within academic word and civil society. The main challenge, which stipulates alternative ideas and consequent debates, is the problem of "human existence or man'/women' living the life" under the new conditions of the postmodernity, aside from the tendency to reduce being to "meaning" or "sense", which is typical for some philosophers of the XXth century (H. Bergson is included in this list). M. Heidegger, who applies the interpretive approaches, – according to his own words, – manifests the hermeneutic "creations of meanings" in his immersion into the "inevitable distortion" of the present in each particular case of interpretation. However, this fact does not prevent Heidegger from paying special attention to the "notional character" of time and temporality, to those characteristics of "notions", which he determines as "phenomena". Taking into consideration the different set of relations in the same philosophic problematization and presumably their intersection, the question still remains to be answered: what does Heidegger investigate in his research of time and temporality: the category or the phenomenon? As far as H. Bergson is concerned, "duration", "memory", "elan vital" are "notions" in the conceptual development of Bergson's intuition.

However, G. Deleuze makes a disputable and very interesting remark, saying that duration and memory are notions, which per se means "living reality" and "vital experience".

Despite M. Heidegger's presumption that Aristotle's interpretations of time are a kind of "fundamental principles", H. Bergson comes into polemic with Aristotle in his substitution of "temps" by a new notion of "durée".

The latter, according to Heidegger's assertions, didn't help him to reach the "genuine phenomenon of time". In addition, M. Heidegger claims that "something", which is "within the time", must be countable, but not obligatory in the spatial meaning: Bergson, according to Heidegger, uses this notion incorrectly because he interprets the character of motion of time as spatial extent, i.e. Bergson comes to the false interpretation of Aristotle's definition when he says that time is space. Heidegger puts an accent on Aristotle's citation in his declaring that time in accordance with its essence is not a "borderline", it is transition and dimension.

By all means, Heidegger's temporality, Bergson's duration and their postmodern interpretations have produced terms, which determine notions with a lot of shades of meaning. At present "temporality" is so widely used that it is often applied as a flexible concept of time, which occupies an intermediate position between the "absolute time" and the "relative time".

In this pluralized context it is generally accepted that approximately at the same time (mid – XXth century) Heidegger's and Bergson's works appeared as the most influential approaches to the interactions of time and temporality. The complicated interwoven web of problems covers many implicit challenges, such as "the end of history" and with it, presumably, the end of time while space is supposed to replace time in the ontological scheme of things (Jameson, 2003).

As it usually happens in postmodernism, much theoretical reflection is represented in rethinking time and temporality in the problematization of ideology, power and political issues, on the one hand, and literary criticism, linguistics, theory of history, – on the other. All this testifies to the fact that the "vital experience" and "temporality", which are represented now in many cultural forms, are still remain in the domain of philosophy with the aim, – in fact, an eternal one, – to gain reconciliation with passing time and human finitude.

In Heidegger's ideas, the comprehension of being is generally grasped as originated from time, and when "timeness" functions as such a condition, we call it "temporality". Thus, according to Heidegger, all the principal

philosophic propositions are temporal propositions.

We should stress an important moment: postmodern researchers generally agree, that Heidegger could not have ventured his conceptions of Dasein's finite temporalization without Bergson's affirmation of the ontological priority of duration, irreducible to linear and homogeneous time. It is also significant that the credit, as a rule, goes back to Bergson for having changed the traditional model of time. The central notion in Bergson's theses is "pure" duration. In Bergson's conceptualization "durée" is "extended experience", the composite of space and duration. It should be noted that in his confrontation with Einstein's theory of relativity Bergson found the basis in the diversity and multiple forms of time: discrete, countable and virtual time. The latter refers to the metaphysical grounds of Bergson's philosophy of irrationalism, where the reality of time is the first principal of metaphysics. By all means, Bergson extends duration beyond the philosophical realm.

Presumably, in Deleuze's analysis of Bergsonian temporality, memory and "alan vital" it is not the past that does not exist; duration, in fact, is memory, and memory is connected with the past. Duration in its essence, determines the virtual diversity. In phenomenological conceptualization the dichotomy of the matter and the consciousness is preserved, in Bergsonism there are images and motion. The latter obtains special significance in the postmodern "new dismemberment" of "images" and "things". This observation points to the important potential characteristic of "post"-postmodern discourses of time. Established as a central focus in Heidegger's and Bergson's conceptual fields, nowadays temporality is seen as possessing a quality of being descriptive of most individuals mostly in their "living lives" in the normalization of change, moreover, in normalizing individuals' instability under the conditions of the "post"-postmodern drifts of paradigms, transformations of binary oppositions and challenges of civilization "drifts". The latter requires the categories of conceptual apparatus, in which individual experiences will be necessarily recognized in the development of temporary ways.



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